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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
and irrational." If "work off" rates were increased
considerably, to a point such that it could no
longer be assumed out of hand that imprisonment
is a harsher form of punishment than a fine,3 then
perhaps the basic premises of Williams and Tate
would be altered, imprisonment would no longer
constitute unequal protection of the laws, and
the unsatisfactory alternatives considered here
would also be unnecessary. 40
Perhaps the greatest problem faced by the
alternative penalties springs from the assumption
that the Tate decision categorically forbids im-
prisonment of indigents when others able to pay a
fine may escapd this mode of punishment. Tate
does not demand this. Writing for the majority,
Justice Brennan declared that Tate
does not suggest any constitutional infirmity
in imprisonment of a defendant with the means
to pay a fine who refuses -or neglects to do so.
Nor is our decision to be understood as preclud-
ing imprisonment as'an enforcement method
when alternative means are unsuccessful despite
the defendant's reasonable efforts to satisfy the
fine by those means; the determination of the
constitutionality of imprisonment in that cir-




" Id. The Court found it unnecessary to answer
this argument, resting the decision squarely on equal
protection grounds.
"9See note 25 supra.
40Probably, however, the rate is immaterial, and the
Supreme Court would never allow imprisonment of
indigents for nonpayment of fines while others may
avoid prison because they are financially better situated.
There seems to be no danger that imprisonment
of an offender who refuses to pay a fine may be
declared unconstitutional. The same may not be
said of the imprisonment of the indigent unable
to pay the fine for whom no suitable alternative
has been found. By leaving this problem unsolved,
Tate appears to be an intermediate case. The
process begun in Williams v. Illiowis' and carried
further by Tate has yet to be completed by a
Court pronouncement that indigents may not be
imprisoned for nonpayment of fines in any case.4
Whatever the Court may in the future decide
to do with the indigent offender who cannot avail
himself of an alternative to imprisonment for
nonpayment of fines, it is clear for the present that
Tate will not allow the State to "impose a fine a's
a sentence and then automatically convert it into
a jail term because the defendant is indigent." 4
Tate leaves questions unanswered, but it serves
to put all on notice that a criminal offender's
economic status must not affect the form of his
punishment any more than it may affect his rights
during the trial process.
41401 U.S. at 400-01.
42399 U.S. 235 (1970).4 ' An interesting question is the effect Take may
have on bail. If the poor may not be put in jail in the
first place because they cannot pay a fine, it seems to
follow that they should not be kept in jail for their
inability to raise bail while the more well-to-do defend-
ants awaiting trial, or appeal, are able to "buy" their
freedom. In each situation the result is the same--the
offender's financial situation determines whether or
not he is to be put in, or remain in, jail.
44 Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970).
JURY TRIA---JUVENILE COURT
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)
The extension of constitutional guaranties to
juveniles-a trend initiated by the Warren Court-
has apparently been reversed with the Supremne
Court's decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.' The
Court held that the right to a jury trial was not
constitutionally mandated in state juvenile
delinquency proceedings.
McKeiver represents the consolidation of Penn-
sylvania and North Carolina cases involving
Joseph McKeiver, Edward Terry and Barbara
Burrus. McKeiver was sixteen years old when he
'403 U.S. 528 (1971).
was charged with robbery, larceny and receiving
stolen goods-felonies under Pennsylvania stat-
utes.2 Terry was fifteen years old when he was
charged with assault and battery on a police officer
and conspiracy-misdemeanors under Penn-
sylvania statutes.' Both were denied a jury trial
and adjudicated delinquent. Their cases were
appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court and
'PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 18, §§ 4704, 4807 (1965).
3 PA. STAT. AN. ch. 18, §§ 4302, 4708 (1965).
4 In re McKeiver, 215 Pa. Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921(1969); In re Terry, 215 Pa. Super. 762, 255 A.2d 922
(1969).
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then joined on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.5
The North Carolina case arose when Barbara
Burrus and approximately forty-five other children
were charged with wilfully impeding traffic, a
misdemeanor under North Carolina law6 during a
series of demonstrations. Their request for a jury
trial was denied and after trial each of the juveniles
was placed on probation. The cases were appealed
to the North Carolina Court of Appeals7 and then
to the North Carolina Supreme Court."
Both the Pennsylvania and North Carolina
Supreme Courts concluded that a juvenile was not
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the funda-
mental fairness test previously enunciated by the
Supreme Court,9 and found that particular ele-
ments within the juvenile process assured the
juvenile protection of his rights thereby rendering
the jury trial non-essential within the juvenile
setting.1 In a brief opinion, the North Carolina
Supreme Court was unable to find authority
extending the jury trial to juveniles and relied upon
the extensive precedent against it."
In a close decision, the Supreme Court affirmed
the conclusions of the Pennsylvania and North
Carolina Supreme Courts. Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the Court's opinion, in which Justices
White and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger
concurred, concluding that a jury trial was not a
necessary safeguard to insure accurate fact-find-
ing.12 Mr. Justice Harlan concurred separately,
contending, as he had in Duncan v. Louisiana,"3
that the fourteenth amendment did not compel
extension of the jury trial guaranty to the states.14
Mr. justice Douglas delivered a dissenting opinion
in which Justices Black and Marshall concurred,
maintaining that the fourteenth amendment
constitutionally mandated state juvenile jury
5 In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
6 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20.174.1 (1969).
7In re Burrus, 4 N.C. App. 523, 167 S.E.2d 454
(1969); In re Shelton, 5 N.C. App. 487, 168 S.E.2d 695
(1969).
8 In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969).
9 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970).
"0 438 Pa. at 348, 265 A.2d at 354 (1970).
"1275 N.C. at 528-9, 169 S.E.2d at 886 (1969).
2 403 U.S. at 547.
"391 U.S. 145 (1968). Duncan held that the sixth
amendment jury trial guaranty was incorporated into
the fourteenth amendment due process guaranties and
therefore was applicable to state criminal proceedings.
See text accompanying notes 43-44 infra.
14 403 U.S. at 557.
trials."5 Mr. Justice Brennan wrote a separate
opinion concurring in the Pennsylvania result but
dissenting from the result in the North Carolina
case.' 6 He argued that while jury trials were not
constitutionally mandated for juveniles, the%
must be assured procedural protection from
judicial arbitrariness."
The significance of the McKeiver decision
emerges most clearly within the historical context
of the juvenile system and the Supreme Court's
involvement with it. The past five years have
witnessed a virtual revolution in juvenile court
proceedings, largely through the impetus of the
Supreme Court's rulings in Kent v. United States,5
it re Gault,19 and In re Winship.2 These decisions,
founded upon the Court's concern over the judicial
abuse of discretionary powers within the juvenile
system,21  profoundly altered the procedural
character of the adjudicative phase of the juvenile
hearing.2
2
The concept of juvenile proceedings arose early
in the twentieth century when reformers suc-
cessfully argued that society's interests were not
properly served by a system that treated children
and adults similarly.2 Illinois first implemented
the idea of a juvenile court in 1899 and other states
soon followed.' 4 Procedural formalities were
purposely eliminated from the court's design and
casualness was stressed in order to minimize the
adversary character of the proceedings.5 This
system survived, largely unchanged, until the
mid-twentieth century, when legal scholars and
social reformers became increasingly distressed
with its failures, which were graphically illustrated
"1 Id. at 557-58.
6 Id. at 553.
17 Id. at 554-55.
18 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
" 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
"397 U.S. 358 (1970).
"1 See 383 U.S. at 556.
2Generally, state juvenile proceedings involve a
bifurcated process: an adjudicative hearing to determine
whether the child is a "delinquent," and a dispositional
hearing to decide what to do about his delinquency.
See Note, A Balancing Approach to the Grant of Pro-
cedural Rights in the Juvenile Court, 64 Nw. U.L. Rxv.
87, 89 (1969).
2" See Flexner & Oppenheimer, The Legal Aspects of
the Juvenile Court, 57 Am. U.L. REv. 65 (1923); Ket-
cham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 585 (1965).
4 See Abbott, The History of the Juvenile Court Move-
ment Throughout the World, in TaE CmIaD, THE Cuiuc
AN = Cou'RT 267, 270 (1925).
25 See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary




by rising juvenile crime rates and a high rate of
recidivism. 26 In 1966, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the juvenile system's failures and indicated
its approval of revisionary efforts in Kent v.
United States.2
7
While Kent did not reach constitutional di-
mensions,2 the Court clearly stated that the
informality of juvenile proceedings did not entitle
the juvenile court to disregard fundamental
procedural guidelines. 29 In Kent, pursuant to a
District of Columbia discretionary statute, the
juvenile court waived jurisdiction over the sixteen-
year-old respondent, abandoning him to the adult
criminal court, without granting him a waiver
hearing or access to his, juvenile social records.
Mr. Justice Fortas expressed his concern in the
majority opinion that the child involved in juvenile
proceedings seemed to be confronted with "the
worst of both worlds," receiving neither the
protections afforded adults nor the solicitous care
intended for children."0 After recognizing the
criti al importance of the waiver of jurisdiction
hearing,' the Court held that the juvenile who was
faced with such a hearing must be accorded certain
procedural safeguards, including counsel, counsel's
access to social records, and a judicial statement of
the reasons underlying the waiver decision.P
26 Between the years 1960 and 1965, arrests of per-
sons under eighteen rose 52 per cent for willful homicide,
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny burglary
and car theft. Arrests for persons over eighteen rose
only 20 per cent during the same period. PSIDENT'S
ComIssIoN ON LAW ENFORcEMENT AND ADMsNISTRA-
TnON or JusTicE, THE CRALLENGE OF CIME IN A FREE
SociEnt 56 (1967) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L. Cano
CoMM'N. REPORT].
The 1065 F.B.I. figures show that of all persons ar-
rested during that year, 30 per cent were under twenty-
one, and 20 per cent were under eighteen. Id. at 55.
In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 per cent of the 16
and 17 year old juveniles referred to the court by
the Youth Aid Division had been before the court
previously. In 1965, 56 per cent of those in the Re-
ceiving Home were repeaters. The SRI study re-
vealed that 61 per cent of the sample juvenile
Court referrals in 1965 had been previously referred
atleast once and that 42 per cent had been referred
at least twice before.
STANFoPD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON CRIME IN TIE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
quoted in Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
2,383 U.S. 541 (1966).
28 Mr. justice Fortas stated: "The Juvenile Court Act
and the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia provide an adequate basis
for the decision of this case, and we go no further." Id.
at 556.
2Id, at 554-5.31 Id. at 555.31 Id.11 d. at 557.
One year later, the Supreme Court expanded its
Kent holding in In re Gault, attaching fundamental
due process guaranties to the adjudicative phase of
state juvenile court proceedings.3 The Court held
that where a juvenile faced possible committment,
certain procedural safeguards were guaranteed him
by the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
The safeguards mentioned were advance notice of
the charges, including particular allegations of the
wrongful conduct; notice of his right to counsel
and the availability of court appointed counsel if
indigent; warning of his privilege against self-
incrimination and right to remain silent; and
warning of his right to confront and cross examine
witnesses.u4
The Gault rationale embodied the Court's
recognition that procedural regularity at the
juvenile level was important because of the serious
consequences involved and to insure the juvenile
system's effectiveness. Mr. Justice Fortas, again
writing for the majority, noted the apparent
failure of the juvenile system and asserted that the
substantive benefits of juvenile proceedings should
not be adversely affected by the implementation of
basic procedural rights. 5 Fortas contended that
any proceeding where the child faced possible loss
of his liberty was comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution. 6 Thus Gault extended certain
of. the fourteenth amendment's due process guar-
anties to the adjudicative phase of state delin-
quency proceedings and seemingly represented the
Supreme Court's judgment that children, like
adults, were entitled to protection from judicial
indiscretion.
In 1970, the Supreme Court again expanded the
accused juvenile's due process rights at the adjudi-
cative stage in It re Winshiip.E7 Winship held that
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
was applicable to state juvenile proceedings. Rely-
ing on Gault, which compared delinquency and
criminal proceedings to the extent that each
potentially threatened the defendant's liberty, the
Court felt that the reasonable doubt standard of
387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault dealt with a fifteen-year-
old youth charged with making lewd and obscene phone
calls who was committed to a state institution for the
remainder of his minority after being adjudicated de-
linquent. The youth's parents were not initially notified
of the charges against him, nor was he represented by
counsel or permitted to confront the complaining wit-
ness.
34 Id. at 31-59.
"Id. at 21.
"Id. at 36.
81397 U.S. 358 (1970).
19711
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proof was an essential element of procedural
fairness at the adjudicative hearing.n Furthermore,
the majority stated that this holding would not
impair the beneficial aspects of the juvenile court
system.39 However, the Court seemed to go beyond
Gault with the assertion that this decision would
not impinge upon the "informality, flexibility or
speed" of the fact-finding hearing.4 The Court's
specific concern with these features of the juvenile
process indicated, at least to one commentator,4'
that the expansion of procedural rights would not
be permitted to interfere with these particular
aspects of the juvenile hearing.
Recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the
right to trial by jury are also relevant to the issues
in McKeiver. In Duncan v. Louisiana,4' the Court
held that the sixth amendment's trial by jury
mandate was incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment as one of the due process guaranties
and was therefore applicable to the states. The
Court limited its decision to those criminal cases
where the right to a jury trial would be recognized
in the federal system.4 The majority also indicated
that the severity of the penalty facing a defendant
represented a major factor in determining whether
the jury trial guaranty attached."
The Court then proceeded in Bloom v. Illinois
to extend the sixth amendment's guaranty to
serious criminal contempt proceedings. 45 The
majority failed to find a significant difference
between serious contempt cases and other serious
crimes where the defendant, as in Bloom, faced a
possible two-year imprisonment.46 They concluded
that neither historical factors nor "the considera-
tions of necessity and efficiency normally offered in
defense of the established rule" 47 justified denying
a jury trial in serious criminal contempt cases.
Considered together, Duncan and Bloom suggest
the Supreme Court's affirmation of a defendant's
8Id. at 368.
3 Id. at 366.
40 Id.
41 [Tihe Court might now regard speed, informality
and flexibility as interests of the state which must
be considered in applying due process standards tojuvenile proceedings.... If applied, the 'informal-
ity, flexibility, or speed' test would militate against
adoption of additional due process rights in juve-
nile proceedings, particularly the right to jury trial.
Comment, Juvenile Due Process in the Lower Courts, 62
J. CRIr. L.C. & P.S. 335, 341-42 (1971).
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
41 Id. at 149.
44 Id. at 159.45 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
46 Id. at 198.
47 Id.
right to a jury trial whenever faced with possible
lengthy incarceration, regardless of the precise
nature of the proceedings.
However, McKeiver revealed the Court's un-
willingness to reach what seemed to be the natural
extension of Gault, Duncan, and their progeny. The
trend established by Kent, Gailt, and Whiship,
each expanding fundamental procedural safeguards
into the adjudicative stage of juvenile proceedings,
was seemingly abandoned by the Court's action.
And, although many elements that the Court
deemed important in Duncan and Bloom were
present, the Court stopped short of applying the
sixth amendment jury trial guaranty to the
juvenile system.
Mr. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion con-
eluded that the jury trial was not an essential
element of fundamental fairness and was therefore
not constitutionally required in the juvenile
setting.41 After reaching this conclusion, Blackmun
listed thirteen reasons supporting his opinion,49
which embody four major considerations: the
juvenile-criminal distinction; the role of jury
trials; their potential effect on juvenile proceedings;
and the existence of significant adverse authority.
Juvenile-Criminal Distinction
Mr. Justice Blackmun carefully distinguished
between the juvenile proceeding and the felony
prosecution, noting that the Court had refrained
from equating the two processes for purposes of the
sixth amendment0 He quoted language from Kent
and Gault which explicitly stated that juvenile
proceedings need not conform with all of the
requirements of the criminal process.51 He also
pointed to the Court's past hesitation to burden
the juvenile system with either a "criminal" or
"civil" label.5 2 Moreover, throughout his opinion,
Justice Blackmun dwelt upon the unique beneficial
aspects of the juvenile process and concluded that
any equation between the two systems ignored the
aims of the juvenile process: fairness, concern,
sympathy and paternal attention.4'
Blackmun's rationale seemingly ignored a
fundamental, underlying concern of the Court in
its previous juvenile decisions. Although the
Supreme Court had refused to equate the two
43403 U.S. at 545.
11 Id. at 545-50.0Id. at 540-41.
51 Id. at 533-34 quoting Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. at 562, and In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30.
52 403 U.S. at 541.
5 Id. at 550.
[Vol. 62
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
processes, both Gault and Winship recognized that
the consequences (incarceration) of an adjudication
of delinquency were comparable in seriousness to a
criminal conviction.5 Blackmun failed to confront
this issue squarely in his efforts to establish the
criminal-delinquent distinction. On the other
hand, justice Douglas' dissent addressed this issue
and emphasized the similarity between the two
processes where the child, as in each of these cases,
faced a possible incarceration of five years. 5 The
dissent also pointed to the prosecutorial nature of
the juvenile proceeding as a further indication of
the two systems' similarity.56 The failure of the
plurality opinion to confront the criminal-delin-
quent distinction in terms of possible incarceration
suggests a shift away from the reasoning of previous
holdings.
Mr. Justice White apparently recognized that
Blackmun had failed to elaborate the differences
between the criminal and juvenile systems, so he
attempted to sharpen the distinctions between the
two processes in his concurring opinion. He argued
that the criminal law attributed wilfullness to the
criminal defendant and therefore punished him for
engaging in unlawful conduct. On the other hand,
the acts of a juvenile, he contended, are deemed the
result of environmental or social pressures. There-
fore the juvenile system was not geared toward
punishment of the youthful offender, but aimed at
his rehabilitation.57 Although the juvenile was
branded a delinquent, White felt that this repre-
sented a less onerous stigmatization than that
attached to his criminal counterpart. Furthermore,
White asserted that the consequences of a delin-
quency finding were less severe than those arising
from a criminal conviction. These observations,
"See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66, quoting
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
61 Douglas stated that "[clonviction for each of these
crimes would subject a person, whether juvenile or
adult, to imprisonment in a state institution." 403 U.S.
at 558. And he later noted that "[j]ust as courts have
sometimes confused delinquency with crime, so have
law enforcement officials treated juveniles not as de-
linquents but as criminals." Id. at 560.
56 Id. at 559. The argument equating the prosecu-
torial nature of juvenile proceedings with the criminal
system was more fully elaborated by the Pennsylvania
appellants in this case. They compared the juvenile and
criminal systems by pointing to such features as the
indictment-like nature of the deliqquency petition, pre-
trial detention facilities, plea-Bargaining processes,
evidentiary rules, general courtroom procedures and
the prison-like character of juvenile institutions. Their
arguments were well summarized by Mr. Justice Black-
mun in his opinion. Id. at 541-43.
7 Id. at 552.
which suggest substantive differences between the
criminal and juvenile systems, compelled White to
join in the majority's decision.
Fairness and the Jury
After examining past juvenile decisions, Mr.
Justice Blackmun established that the Court had
only extended certain fundamental rights to the
juvenile,-" and concluded that trial by jury was not
an essential safeguard to assure procedural fair-
ness. In reaching this conclusion, Blackmun applied
the fundamental fairness test utilized by the Court
in Gault and Winship. 9 The jury, he stated, was
not necessarily an essential component of accurate
fact-finding.60 He pointed to workmen's compensa-
tion, probate, and deportation proceedings, along
with military trials, as instances where the judicial
system had functioned effectively without the use
of a jury. Further, he cited the post-Duncan case of
DeStefano v. Woods," where the Court refused to
apply Duncan retroactively, and Williams v.
Florida,n where the Court found nothing improper
with Florida's use of a six-man criminal jury rather
than the customary twelve-man jury. These
holdings, he asserted, indicated the Court's feeling
that accurate factual determinations could be
reached without the utilization of a jury."
Justice Blackmun, however, did not satis-
factorily confront the rationale of recent decisions.
The Court's previous juvenile holdings indicated an
abiding concern with the procedural fairness of the
adjudicative phase of the delinquency proceeding,
and Winship expressly revealed the Court's con-
cern about accurate factual determinations. 4 These
decisions alone do not provide authority for the
attachment of the jury trial guaranty at the
juvenile level, but Duncan and Bloom strongly
suggest this result. Indeed, Duncan specifically
stated that the possible length of imprisonment was
3Id. at 553, 545.
5Id. at 543. The fundamental fairness test was well
expressed by Mr. Justice Brennan in his majority Win-
ship opinion:
Gault decided that, although the fourteenth amend-
ment does not require that the hearing at this stage
[adjudicatory] conform with all the requirements of
a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative
proceeding, the Due Process Clause does require
application during the adjudicatory hearing of 'the
essentials of due process and fair treatmen:.'
397 U.S. at 359.60 403 U.S. at 543.
61392 U.S. 631 (1968).
399 U.S. 78 (1970).
6403 U.S. at 543.
"See 397 U.S. at 363.
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important in determining whether the right
attached,65 and Bloom extended the right beyond
criminal prosecutions." The juvenile system
presented a judicial proceeding which arguably was
implicitly subsumed within the Court's language in
these two cases. Blackmun's failure to distinguish
these decisions suggests his inability to refute the
argument that the prospect of incarceration imbues
the juvenile proceeding with a criminal aura.
The dissenters, concluding that no substantial
difference inheres between the juvenile and
criminal systems, had no difficulty finding that the
fourteenth amendment mandated the right to a
jury trial. Mr. Justice Douglas quoted from Justice
Black's dissent in DeBacker v. Brainad7 where
Black wrote that a jury trial was a fundamental
aspect of criminal justice in the English speaking
world.6 However, Douglas did not specifically
answer the plurality's assertion that the absence of
a jury would have little significant effect on the
ultimate accuracy of factual determinations.
Mr. Justice Brennan agreed with the plurality
that the fundamental fairness test was the ap-
propriate standard to apply.69 He also agreed that
juvenile proceedings were not criminal within the
meaning of the sixth amendment. Yet he main-
tained that while a jury trial was not mandated,
the juvenile's interest must somehow be protected
in the fact-finding process. 70 He found that the
Pennsylvania system provided this safeguard by
permitting the juvenile to focus public attention
on his case since there was no statutory bar to the
public's admission to the proceedings. Public
scrutiny thus adequately protected the accused
juvenile from judicial prejudice or arbitrariness. 71
65 391 U.S. at 159.
66 391 U.S. at 194.
67 396 U.S. 28 (1969). This case presented the same
issue involved in the present case-the juvenile's right
to a jury trial. The Supreme Court, however, felt that
DeBacker's case was inappropriate for resolution of this
issue because his hearing had antedated Duncan and
Bloom, which had been accorded prospective applica-
tion in DeStefano. Hence the Court dismissed De-
Backer's appeal, with Justices Black and Douglas filing
dissents.
63 396 U.S. at 34.
9 Id. at 403 U.S. at 554.
70 The Due Process Clause commands not a par-
ticular procedure, but only a result: in my Brother
Blackmun's words, 'fundamental fairness... in
factfinding.' In the context of these and similarjuvenile delinquency proceedings, what this means
is that the States are not bound to provide jury
trials on demand so long as some other aspect of
the process adequately protects the interests that
Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve.
Id. at 554.7 1 Id.
In the North Carolina cases, however, the public
was excluded from the proceedings, thereby com-
pelling reversal. This approach, however, would
prove unworkable in most states since they require
confidentiality in juvenile proceedings by statute.72
Moreover, Brennan did not support his assertion
that a public trial insures the juvenile procedural
protection with the citation of either examples or
judicial experience.
Preservation of Juvenile System
Justice Blackmun evidenced a deep-seated con-
cern that implementation of the jury trial guaranty ,
might either undermine the entire purpose of the
juvenile court or unduly burden its already strained
resources. He found that Gault and Winship were
not intended to recast the existing juvenile sys-
tem.7 The Winship holding which emphasized
"informality, flexibility and speed" as important
aspects of the juvenile system74 provided him with
significant precedent as he argued that a jury trial
would infuse juvenile proceedings with delay and
formality, and would probably provoke unde-
sirable publicity.7 5 Basically, Blackmun felt that
the jury trial threatened to convert juvenile
proceedings into full-scale criminal adversary
proceedings, thereby negating the need for separate
systems.76 Further, he feared that the jury trial
requirement would prevent state experimenta-
tionY
The plurality's concern for the substantive
benefits embodied in the juvenile system's en-
lightened attitudes toward rehabilitation and
treatment are justified to the extent that a jury
trial might threaten them. Justice Blackmun,
however, confined his discussion to the general
theoretical underpinnings of the juvenile system
without closely examining its mechanics. He failed
to confront the argument that the jury trial would
only affect the adjudicative, and not the dis-
positional, phase of the juvenile hearing.76 Since the
juvenile system's unique benefits consist mainly of
discretionary intake procedures that permit
disposition without adjudication and flexible
sentencing,79 the implementation of jury trials
72See, e.g., ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-20(6)
(1967); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. ch. 2151.35 (1964).
71403 U.S. at 534.
74397 U.S. at 366.71403 U.S. at 550.76 Id. at 550-51.
7 Id. at 547.78 Id. at 542.
79 See Ketcham, Guideline from Gaidt: Revolutionary




during the adjudicative phase would have little
effect on these benefits. Blackmun's opinion failed
to distinguish between the adjudicative and dis-
positional phases, unlike previous decisions, which
had concluded that the imposition of other pro-
cedural safeguards at the adjudicative stage would
not impair the dispositional stage or other special
features of the juvenile system.80 justice Black-
mun's specific concern with speed and flexibility
seemingly relate as much to the problems of
judicial administration as they do to the beneficial
aspects of the system.
The dissenters carefully considered the potential
impact of jury trials, however.8n Justice Douglas'
argument was based upon his contention that the
juvenile court's rehabilitative services were useless
in cases where the child felt that he was dealt with
unfairly during his adjudicative hearing.ss After
examining the experience of jurisdictions where
juveniles had been offered jury trials, Douglas
demonstrated that the expected backlogs had not
80 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366; In re Gault,
387 U.S. at 21.81 Mr. Justice Douglas attached the opinion of Judge
DeCiantis of the Family Court of Providence, Rhode
Island in In re McCloud as an appendix to his dissenting
opinion. The McCloud case involved a juvenile who
was charged with the rape of a seventeen-year-old
girl. Judge DeCiantis granted his request for a jury
trial in the appendixed opinion. DeCiantis carefully
examined the practical aspects of the problems that
might arise with the implementation of the jury trial.
403 U.S. at 563.
This note will regard DeCiantis' appendixed opinion
as a part of the minority's dissenting opinion, but
Justice Douglas' statements will be distinguished from
those of Judge DeCiantis.
2 Judge DeCiantis made this observation:
The child who feels that he has been dealt with
fairly and not merely expediently or as speedily as
possible will be a better prospect for rehabilitation.
Many of the children come from broken homes,
from the ghettos; they often suffer from low self-
esteem; and their behavior is frequently a symptom
of their own feelings of inadequacy. Traumatic ex-
periences of denial of basic rights only accentuate
the past deprivation and contribute to the problem.
Thus, a general societal attitude of acceptance of
the juvenile as a person entitled to the same protec-
tion as an adult may be the true beginning of the
rehabilitative process.
Id. at 562.
The National Crime Commission expressed the same
concerns:
There is increasing evidence that the informal pro-
cedures contrary to the original expectation, may
themselves constitute a further obstacle to effective
treatment of the delinquent to the extent that they
engender in the child a sense of injustice provoked
by the seemingly all-powerful and challengeless
exercise of authority by judges and probation offi-
cers.
NAT'L. CaRo Comex'. REPoRT 85.
materialized and, in the event they might, he
suggested smaller juries."' He further contended
that public trials would not affect the juvenile
court policy of confidentiality, particularly since
many groups already had access to the court and
social records.8 The role of the expert juvenile
court would not be disregarded with the implemen-
tation of jury trials. Rather, the judge could still
exercise his discretionary powers during the
important dispositional phase.8 5 The dissent's
observations on the probable impact of a jury trial
suggest that the plurality's concern over the
continued existence of the present juvenile system,
particularly with the elements of speed, flexibility,
and informality, are irrelevant to the quality of
juvenile justice or the system's rehabilitative
effectiveness.
Existing Athority and Practices
Mr. Justice Blackmun, while recognizing the
system's failures, cited substantial authority-
state court decisions, existing statutes, and pub-
lished reports-that either denied or argued against
jury trials for juveniles. The National Crime
Commission Report failed to recommend that jury
trials be implemented on the juvenile level while
specifically recommending that the existing
juvenile system be perpetuated.6 The majority of
state courts that had considered the question of
jury trials since Duncan had concluded that the
fourteenth amendment did not mandate their
extension to juvenile hearings. Blackmun asserted
that widespread state practices should merit
consideration in determining whether a particular
practice comports with due process, and he pointed
to twenty-nine states that deny juveniles the
right to trial by jury by statuten and ten others
that permit it in only limited circumstances. In
addition, he cited the Uniform Juvenile Court Act,
1' 403 U.S. at 565 (DeCiantis, J., appended).
8Id. at 567-68 (DeCiantis, J., appended). De-
Ciantis also quoted from the National Crime Com-
mission Report: "A juvenile's adjudication record is re-
quired by the law of most jurisdictions to be private and
confidential; in practice the confidentiality of those re-
ports is often violated." Id. at 568. See NAT'L. CRuE
Comm'N. REPOR 75.
851d. at 568 (DeCiantis, J., appended).
"I See generally NAT'L. CRImE Come'N. REPORT 9.
7 See e g. In re Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d
380 (1970); In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 255 A.2d 419
(1969).
8 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 208.060 (1962); Amn.
STAT. A.N. § 260.155 sub. 1. (1971).
" See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-8-2 (1963);
KANs. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (1969 Supp.).
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